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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

REPLY TO STATE'S RESPONSE
TO APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR
REHEARING

v.
Case No. 021027
Priority No. 1

RONNIE LEE GARDNER,
Appellant/Petitioner.

INTRODUCTION
The Statement of Issues, Statement of the Case, and
Summary of the Argument are set forth in Appellant's Petition for
Rehearing at vii-3.

Appellant takes this opportunity to briefly

reply to the State's Response to his Petition for Rehearing.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO GIVE A
LIMITING INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE USE OF WAYNE
JORGENSON'S TESTIMONY WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
In its response to Appellant's Petition for Rehearing
("Response"), the State argues that if error occurred in the
admission of Officer Jorgenson's testimony, such error was not
manifest and prejudicial.

Response at 3-9.

Consistent with its

opening brief, the State does not argue that Officer Jorgenson's
testimony was admissible for substantive purposes.
In arguing that the error was not manifest and
prejudicial, the State first contends that "it is not clear that
such a limiting instruction was required" and that "there is some

criticism of the use of limiting instructions which suggests that
juries do not understand such a subtle distinction in the use of
evidence.

[Citation omitted.]"

Response at 5.

Although the State

cited United States v. Sisto, 534 F.2d 616, 624-5, n.10, 11 (5th
Cir. 1976) in support of this latter proposition, the criticism
alluded to by the Sisto Court revolved around "the evidentiary rule
limiting the use of prior unsworn inconsistent statements of a
witness to impeachment of that witness" (Sisto, 534 F.2d at 624) and
not the use of limiting instructions once it has been determined
that the evidence is admissible for the limited purpose of
impeaching credibility.1
Contrary to the implication in the State's brief that
Sisto supports an argument that the jury would not understand the
distinction in the use of the evidence even if it had been properly
instructed, Sisto actually supports the opposite argument—that a
properly instructed jury would understand the distinction and

1 Although the Sisto Court acknowledged that the rule
limiting the use of prior inconsistent statements has been
criticized, it also pointed out that
Despite the criticism, every circuit follows
the "orthodox rule" that "prior inconsistent
statements may be used to impeach, but should not
be treated as having any substantive or
independent testimonial value," United States v.
Tavares, 9 Cir. 1975, 512 F.2d 872, 874. See
cases cited, id. at 874-75 n.6.
534 F.2d at 625 n.ll. The Sisto Court went
orthodox view that the danger of prejudice,
fraud or from faulty recollection, inherent
statements as direct evidence far outweighs
might have." Id. at 625.
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on to "adhereM to the
whether from deliberate
in the admission of such
any probative value they

correctly apply it.

The Sisto Court emphatically stated:

Second, we must assume that a properly instructed
jury would in fact limit its consideration of [the
witness1] testimony to the issue of the
[co-conspirator' s] credibility.
Id. at 625,
The Court stated further that prior decisions of the
Court "are bottomed on the conviction that a carefully instructed
jury can indeed be led to understand the distinction and abide by
itow

Id. at 625.

Hence, Sisto supports the proposition that the

jury should have been instructed as to the limited use to be made of
Officer Jorgenson's testimony, and that if the jury had been
properly instructed, it would have understood and followed such
instructions.

See also United States v. Lester, 491 F.2d 680 (6th

Cir. 1974) (conviction reversed where trial court failed to instruct
jury as to limited use of evidence).
The State acknowledges that the trial court gave a
limiting instruction in United States v. McManaman, 606 F.2d 919
(10th Cir. 1979), one of the few cases dealing with a statement
taken in violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel which was
admitted for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness.
However, the State strains to interpret that instruction as one
which "did not in fact limit the jury's use of the statements."
Response at 7.

Contrary to such an assertion, the limitng

instruction informed the jury that the evidence was "to be used by
you only in connection or as to the question of impeachment of the
testimony of the defendant."

McManaman, 606 F.2d at 924.
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A poorly

worded sentence at the end of that instruction does not detract from
the clear mandate to the jury as to the use to be made of the
evidence.

See discussion in Appellant's Petition at 5-7.
The State points out that in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.

222, 223 (1971), the United States Supreme Court "even noted that
both counsel argued the substance of the statements and did not find
that such substantive use was improper.n

Response at 7.

While the

United States Supreme Court did acknowledge that both attorneys
argued in closing "the substance of the impeaching statements[]"
(401 U.S. at 223), the Court did not directly address the propriety
of such argument.

Furthermore, unlike the instant case, the trial

court gave a limiting instruction in Harris.

Hence, the State's

assertion that "Harris disposes of this issue [as to whether the
substantive use of the evidence in closing prejudices the defendant
where no limiting instruction was given]" is incorrect.

Response at

8.
The factors surrounding the taking of the statement
should have made the fifth and sixth amendment violations obvious to
the trial judge.

The statement was taken by an officer guarding

Mr. Gardner after he had been arraigned on the charges and without
the presence of counsel.

The custodial interrogation flagged the

fifth amendment issue for the judge; the lack of counsel following
arraignment flagged the sixth amendment violation.

Furthermore,

although the jury could not be expected to ascertain that the
testimony was applicable only to Mr. Gardner's credibility where the
evidence came in during rebuttal, the failure of the State to
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introduce such damaging evidence during its case-in-chief should
have alerted the judge as to the limited use of the testimony.
As set forth in Appellant's Reply Brief at 31,
"Officer Jorgenson's testimony was the only testimony which
indicated that Mr. Gardner knowingly shot Michael Burdell."

See

also Appellant's opening Brief at 79; Petition for Rehearing at
7-10.

Despite the State's assertions to the contrary, overwhelming

evidence showing that Mr. Gardner intended to kill Mr. Burdell does
not exist in this case.

Mr. Gardner had been shot in the lung prior

to shooting Mr. Burdell (R. 2006, 2225).

When Mr. Macri was face to

face with Mr. Gardner immediately before the shooting, Mr. Gardner
looked "very confused," "blank" and "helpless" (R. 2240).
Appellant's opening Brief at 99-103.

See

Although Mr. Gardner did know

a gun would be at the drinking fountain, and took the gun when he
located it, possession of a gun does not automatically establish an
intent to kill.

Furthermore, pulling a trigger to use a gun does

not establish that the perpetrator had the requisite intent for
capital homicide.
Given the limited evidence supporting a finding that
Mr. Gardner had the requisite intent, coupled with the overwhelming
impact of Officer Jorgenson's testimony, it cannot be said that the
error in admitting the testimony and using it for substantive
purposes was harmless.

Mr. Gardner respectfully requests that this

Court grant rehearing on this issue.
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POINT II. THE ERRONEOUS MANSLAUGHTER INSTRUCTION
REQUIRES REVERSAL.
In requesting rehearing on this issue, Mr» Gardner's
position is that this Court's decision makes too broad a sweep in
finding any error to be harmless and the fact that defendant was
involved in another crime should not preclude jury consideration of
whether the explanation was excusable.
Although the State claims that the hypothetical
situations set forth in Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 12-13
"are not situations in which the actor's criminal activity produced
the emotional disturbance[]" (Response at 11), on the contrary, some
of such examples do involve situations where the criminal activity
at least arguably produces the emotional disturbance; e.g. the
examples of sleep deprivation brought on by cocaine consumption and
medication imbalance as the result for obtaining additional drugs
through a forged prescription.

Jury assessment of the

reasonableness of an explanation should not be precluded simply
because the defendant was involved in another crime which may have
led to or produced the emotional disturbance.
The State claims that "[i]t would be a ludicrous result
if any person who attempted to escape lawful custody could claim as
mitigation of intentional murder the fact that he was upset when his
escape plans went awry either because of his unfamiliarity with the
gun or because he was wounded."

Response at 12. However, an intent

to escape does not automatically equate with an intent to kill so as
to warrant imposition of a death penalty.

- 6 -

The physical and mental

trauma to an individual as the result of being shot in the lung
could well result in the indiscriminate pulling of a trigger.

The

jury should decide whether the excuse is reasonable and factor into
that decision the fact that the defendant was involved in the
commission of another crime.

Whether the other crime was tangential

or integral to the emotional disturbance and whether the excuse was
therefore reasonable should be left to the jury.

Manslaughter

should not be disregarded simply because the defendant was involved
in another crime.
Mr. Gardner acknowledges this Court's statement as set
forth in footnoote 2 that "generally an error in a manslaughter
instruction where the jury finds an intentional killing is not
prejudicial."

State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 13 (1989).

However, as set forth in Point III of Mr. Gardner's Petition for
Rehearing, the trial court's erroneous oral instruction precluded
the jury from ever considering whether Mr. Gardner suffered from an
extreme emotional disturbance.

Hence, the "general" rule finding no

prejudice where the jury found an intentional killing alluded to in
footnote 2 is not applicable in this case where the oral instruction
precluded the jury from considering manslaugther.

POINT III. THE ORAL INSTRUCTION WHEN READ IN
CONJUNCTION WITH THE OTHER INSTRUCTIONS PRECLUDED
THE JURY FROM CONSIDERING MANSLAUGHTER, REQUIRING
REVERSAL.
The State agrees that "in a case where a defendant has
raised a legitimate extreme emotional disturbance defense, a jury
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should probably be directed to consider the existence of such a
disturbance after a finding of intentional or knowing murder[]w
(Response at 13), but argues that the manslaughter defense was not
legitimate in this case.
As argued in Point II, whether the disturbance was
reasonable should have been left to the jury and not discarded
simply because Mr. Gardner had been involved in another crime. Had
the jury been properly instructed, both as to the nature of a
manslaughter defense and the order in which it should consider the
offenses, the State's position would be more tenable.

However,

where the jury was not given the opportunity to determine whether
Mr. Gardner's involvement in criminal activity produced the
emotional disturbance and, if so, whether the emotional disturbance
was therefore unreasonable, error requiring reversal occurred in
this case.

POINT IV. THIS COURT SHOULD REACH THE
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION OF SUBSECTION (h) OR,
ALTERNATIVELY, PROVIDE MR. GARDNER RELIEF UNDER
STATE V. JAMES.
Mr. Gardner challenges this Court's ruling regarding the
subsection (h) issue asserting that (a) the facts of the case could
have and should have been separated from the prior convictions
introduced by the State through subsection (h); (b) contrary to the
Court's characterization of the facts, prosecutors did not limit the
use of prior convictions to the element of subsection (h) but,
rather, urged that Mr. Gardner acted in conformity with the prior
crimes and that the prior crimes showed the intent of Mr. Gardner;
- 8 -

and (c) the evidence of Mr. Gardner's intent was not overwhelming,
and the Court erroneously concluded that any error of subsection (h)
evidence was harmless.

Because of the mischaracterizations of the

facts of the case, Mr. Gardner urges that this Court rehear the
issue and reach the question of the constitutionality of
subsection (h) or, alternatively, provide Mr. Gardner with the
benefit of this Court's ruling in State v. James, 767 P.2d 549 (Utah
1989).
The State responded to Mr. Gardner's Petition for
Rehearing by reiterating this Court's opinion and by asserting
several additional arguments to which Mr. Gardner briefly responds.
The State argues that "even if this Court did strike this
circumstance [subsection (h)] for the initial guilt phase
determination on constitutional grounds, defendant cannot evade the
other two aggravating circumstances and any error in the
introduction of the two robberies would be harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt."
is incorrect.

Brief of Respondent at 16.

The State's premise

Several federal circuit courts of appeal and the

United States Supreme Court have discussed the issue of what happens
when one of several aggravating circumstances was erroneously
admitted or later rejected on appeal on grounds of
unconstitutionality.

Examining those opinions discloses the error

of the State's position.
In Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1987),
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals extensively analyzed this issue
concluding that when state capital sentencing schemes require a
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balancing and/or weighing of aggravating circumstances against
mitigation evidence that a rejection of the propriety of one
aggravating circumstance out of several requires that the jury
verdict be vacated and the process reinitiated.

Id. at 1483. The

United States Supreme Court affirmed that position as correct.
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S.
S.Ct.

(1988).

, 100 L.Ed.2d 372, 382-83, 108

See also Collins v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 258 (8th

Cir. 1985), cert, denied 447 U.S. 1013 (1986).
A recent decision from this Court buttresses the analysis
of Mr. Gardner's position.

In State v. Mitchell, 116 Utah Adv. Rep.

3 (August 30, 1989), this Court clarified its role in examining
harmless error determinations.

This Court noted:

[T]he reviewing court is to decide whether,
considering all the evidence, there was a
reasonable likelihood that the jury would have
decided the case differently. If such a
likelihood exists, defendant is entitled to have a
jury consider the case anew, free from the taint
of the inadmissible evidence. The reasonable
likelihood question is not just the substantial
evidence test in disguise; rather, it focuses on
the taint caused by the error. If the taint is
sufficient, it is irrelevant that there is
sufficient untainted evidence to support a
verdict. Any stricter interpretation of harmful
error . . . runs the risk of substituting our
judgment for that of the jury and could be
criticized as encouraging the improper admission
of evidence by defacto weakening the sanctions
against it.
Mitchell, 116 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6 (citations omitted).

Accordingly,

Mr. Gardner insists that the erroneous introduction of
subsection (h) evidence into the guilt phase of this trial
sufficiently prejudiced him such that a new trial is warranted.

- 10 -

The State next urges that when the prosecutor argued the
prior convictions to establish intent (see Petition for Rehearing at
20-25), he did so properly under the exceptions of Rule 404(b).
Brief of Respondent at 16, That position is contrary to the facts
of this case and the governing law.

Rule 404(b) states:

Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to
prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs or acts.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983).

This Court has noted

that other crimes evidence is not admissible unless it has "a
special relevance to a controverted issue and is introduced for a
purpose other than to show the defendant's predisposition to
criminality."

State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988) (citing

State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985)).

To be

admissible, the prior conviction evidence must prove some fact
material to the crime charged.
(Utah 1982).

State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172

In State v. Forsyth, this Court stated:

Evidence is not admitted merely because it shows a
common plan, scheme, or a manner of operation.
Instead, evidence of a common plan, scheme, or
manner of operation is admitted where it tends to
prove some fact material to the crime charged.
Id. at 1176-77. While Rule 404(b) places intent with the other
articulated exceptions of plan, scheme, or manner or operation, as
permissible reasons to admit evidence of past crimes, the State is
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incorrect in arguing that the prior crimes in this case somehow
prove the material element of intent required for the conviction of
a capital homicide.

Cases interpreting Rule 404(b) have required

much more of a nexus than that urged here by the State.

See

State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1987) (evidence of prior
forgery conviction admissible in burglary/forgery trial where a
unique and common scheme was employed by the defendant in both cases
and where his identity was also in issue); State v. McClain, 706
P.2d 603 (Utah 1985) (admission into evidence of nine other returned
checks from the same three-month period was proper in a bad check
case to allow inference of the defendant's knowledge, intent, or the
absence of mistake); State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982)
(blank checks found in defendant's car which were identical to
checks fraudulently endorsed by a companion were admissibLe at his
trial to allow inference of knowlege of the fraud and intentional
participation in the forgery; State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah
1980) (evidence of prior acts in Arizona of accepting and keeping
money for machines he failed to deliver to merchants, though
uncharged, were admissible against defendant at his trial for the
same behavior in Utah because of the proximity in time, uniqueness
of the operation, and to allow inference of knowledge and intent).
Comparing the above cases to the facts of Mr. Gardner's
case demonstrates that the State's argument is nothing more than a
subterfuge to allow the admission of his prior crimes evidence to
stand.

In reality, the only value of that evidence was for the

jurors to surmise that Mr. Gardner acted in conformity with his
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criminal past as actually argued by the prosecutor in closing.

See

Petition for Rehearing at 22; R. 2519).
The State next proposes that the introduction of
Mr. Gardner's other prior convictions was not plain error but rather
invited error.

Brief of Respondent at 17.

assertion are warranted.

Several comments on this

First, the facts of this case are

substantially different than those in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546
(Utah 1987), relied upon by the State.

In Tillman, the defendant

introduced evidence and argued that evidence to the'jury from his
perspective.

The prosecutor then argued that the same evidence,

from his perspective, established completely different conclusions
contrary to the interests of the defendant.

In Mr. Gardner's case,

the defendant admitted non-subsection (h) prior convictions through
error or mistake but never argued or referenced those convictions
again.

However, once introduced, the prosecutor utilized those

prior convictions to attack credibility and to infer intent.

More

importantly, the prosecutor used the subsection (h) prior
convictions to also argue intent; and, contrary to the State's
assertions and the opinion by this Court, it cannot be argued that
that error by the prosecutor was somehow invited by Mr. Gardner.
Second, the State's attempt to excuse the introduction of
the prior convictions because many attorneys in Utah were under the
impression, prior to State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986),
that such priors were admissible is unpersuasive.
did not change Rule 609.

State v. Banner

The plain language of the Rule and cases

such as State v. Saunders indicated the prejudicial nature of prior
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conviction evidence and the inadmissibility of those convictions in
this case.

The invited error analysis, at a minimum, must fail

regarding the subsection (h) prior convictions which were introduced
by the prosecution and which were incorrectly argued by the
prosecutor to support his assertion that they somehow established
Mr. Gardner's intent in this particular case.
With this reply to the State's answer, Mr. Gardner
respectfully reiterates his position outlined in the Petition for
Rehearing that this Court rehear this issue and reach the
constitutionality of subsection (h) or, alternatively, afford him
the benefit of this Court's decision in State v. James, 767 P.2d 549
(Utah 1989) .

POINT V. MR. GARDNER'S RIGHTS TO A
CONSTITUTIONALLY ADEQUATE SENTENCING DETERMINATION
WERE VIOLATED WHEN MITIGATION EVIDENCE WAS KEPT
FROM THE JURY.
Mr. Gardner has requested rehearing on the issue of two
varieties of mitigation evidence presented at the penalty phase of
his trial but rejected by the trial court.
at 27-41.

Petition for Rehearing

Both this Court, in its opinion, and the State, in

responding to Mr. Gardner's Petition for Rehearing, have failed to
recognize and address statutory language which permits the admission
of the evidence.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2) does not limit mitigation
evidence to the nature and circumstances of the crime, the character
of the defendant, his background, and his mental and physical
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history as viewed by this Court and the State.

See State v.

Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10-11; Brief of Respondent at 19-20.
Rather, the plain language of the statute indicates that evidence
relevant to sentence includes the above matters but is not limited
to only that evidence; the section instructs that any other facts in
mitigation of penalty are also relevant.
§ 76-3-207(2) and (2)(g).

Utah Code Ann.

Thus, the trial court abused its

discretion in prohibiting the mitigation evidence jLE the evidence
was relevant.
As indicated in the Petition for Rehearing, a variety of
reasons exist to support the relevance of the proffered evidence.
The testimony of the friends and associates of Mr. Burdell was
relevant because (1) it mitigated the possible punishment of death
allowing jurors to conclude mercy and sympathy warranted life
imprisonment as punishment, and (2) the prosecutor invited the
evidence of Mr. Burdell's wishes on punishment when he postulated
how unfortunate it is that so little is heard about the victim and
then proceeded to introduce a number of Mr. Burdell's exceptional
qualities and contributions, now lost.2

See Petition for Rehearing

at 38; R. 2533.

2 The prosecutor's comments regarding the victim,
Mr. Burdell, and his qualities and contributions are themselves
violative of Mr. Gardner's rights. Both Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S.
496 (1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers,
U.S.
, 109 S.Ct.
2207 (1989), hold that such victim impact commentary has no place in
the capital sentencing setting. The prosecutor's remarks on this
point, as in Gathers, requires reversal (South Carolina v. Gathers,
109 S.Ct. at 2210) or, at a minimum, that the jury fully hear the
wishes of Mr. Burdell. Either way, Mr. Gardner's death sentence
must be vacated.
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The evidence of the affidavits of the other attorneys was
similarly relevant because (1) the affidavits permitted the jurors
to mitigate the penalty and impose life rather than death as a
sentence, (2) the prosecutor invited the evidence by eliciting
testimony about individuals who had escaped from prison, which had
nothing to do with the nature and circumstances of this crime or
Mr. Gardner himself; and (3) an issue not yet discussed by this
Court or the State, the fact that the affidavits corrected jury
misinformation about who had or had not received the death penalty
in Utah.

See Petition for Rehearing at 39-41.
As the evidence proposed was relevant and capable of

mitigating the penalty from death to life imprisonment, the trial
court abused its discretion in denying its admission into evidence
and prejudiced Mr, Gardner's rights.

Accordingly, Mr. Gardner

respectfully requests that this Court grant rehearing on this issue.

POINT VI. VERDICT FORMS AND PENALTY PHASE
INSTRUCTIONS IN MR. GARDNER'S CASE PROVIDED AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF DEATH IN THE MINDS
OF THE JURORS.
Mr. Gardner urges in his Petition for Rehearing that the
verdict forms presented to the jurors impermissibly established
death as the presumed penalty.

Under the verdict forms utilized by

the court in his case, the sentence of life was attainable only
through default—failure to unanimously reach a decision of death.
In its answer, the State mischaracterizes the issue
raised by Mr. Gardner.

The State asserts that somehow Mr., Gardner
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wants to create a new requirement that unanimity is a prerequisite
for a life sentence.

As the State itself suggests, that assertion

is indeed preposterous.

For clarification, Mr. Gardner is not

asking for a new presumption nor new evidentiary requirements.

He

only asks that this Court require that the verdict forms submitted
to the jury reflect the appropriate focus of the penalty phase—life
not death being the presumed penalty.

See Petition for Rehearing at

42-46.
Mr. Gardner insists that the verdict forms as submitted
necessarily guided the jurors to attain a unanimous verdict of
death, allowing them to reach a life sentence by default only.

As

argued in the Petition for Rehearing, that system is
unconstitutionally skewed.

Such a system ignores the entire body of

law which recognizes that the death penalty is a unique penalty and
occurs in only a minority of capital cases, let alone homicide cases
in general.

See State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982); State v.

Holland, 111 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (June 21, 1989).

To the extent Utah

Code Ann. § 76-3-207(3) permits the behavior challenged in this
issue, the statute is similarly fatally flawed.
Accordingly, Mr. Gardner asks that rehearing be granted
on this issue.

POINT VII. THE UTAH DEATH PENALTY SCHEME
IMPERMISSIBLY SHIFTS THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE
DEFENDANT AT THE SENTENCING PHASE OF THE CAPITAL
TRIAL.
Mr. Gardner asserts that this Court failed to reach the
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question of whether the Utah death penalty scheme impermissibly
shifts the burden of proof to the defendant in the penalty phase of
the capital trial, and he asks for rehearing on this issue. The
State suggests that no rehearing is necessary because even if this
question is not answered by the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988), this Court
has reached this very issue in Pierre v. Morris, 607 P.2d 812 (Utah
1980) . See State's Brief at 25.

The State's reliance on Pierre v.

Morris demonstrates why rehearing this issue is appropriate.
In Pierre v. Morris, Chief Justice Hall wrote the opinion
indicating that the burden of proof was not shifted to the defendant
in the penalty phase, rather defendant only bears the burden of
going forward.

Id. at 815.

That opinion, however, was joined by

only one Justice, with two other Justices concurring in the result
and the final Justice dissenting.
opinion is a plurality opinion.

Thus, the Pierre v. Morris
Furthermore, Justice Stewart, who

concurred in the result in Pierre v. Morris, has written an opposing
view in State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).

In Brown, Justice Stewart stated:

In the penalty phase, after guilt has been proved,
the jury is necessarily aware that it has found an
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable
doubt, and the prosecution, in arguing for
imposition of the death penalty, will undoubtedly
dwell upon that fact. If the jury may impose
death merely by finding that aggravating
circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances (a
preponderance of evidence test) a death penalty is
virtually assured.
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Id. at 273-74.

While it is true that Justice Stewart's comments in

Brown predate this Court's opinion in State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71
(Utah 1981), which changed the standard of balancing aggravating
circumstances against mitigating circumstances from a preponderance
to beyond a reasonable doubt, that change does not reallocate the
"defacto" shift of the burden from the defendant back to the
prosecution.

Accordingly, this Court has yet to decisively answer

the question Mr. Gardner now presents.
Mr. Gardner points to the arguments by the prosecutor in
his penalty phase to demonstrate that the evil recognized by Justice
Stewart in Brown is, in fact, a reality.

The prosecutor vigorously

argued that the three aggravating circumstances already found beyond
a reasonable doubt by the jurors in the guilt phase were again
applicable to the penalty phase and were of great weight
(R. 2844-46).
this point.

See Addendum A for complete text of his argument on
From that moment on, it was incumbent on Mr. Gardner to

prove that the great weight of those aggravating circumstances were
outweighed by mitigation evidence.

Such a shift creates much more

than a change in the burden of going forward; the shift creates a
realistic and onerous change in the burden of proof.
The State suggests that because jurors must also find the
death penalty is the appropriate sentence in this case beyond a
reasonable doubt (Brief of Respondent at 27), any potential error
from the above shift in burden is corrected.

That urging ignores

that due process requires the State—never the defendant—to carry
the burden of proving each element beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970).

Accordingly, Mr. Gardner insists that his

constitutional rights have been violated and that this Court should
grant rehearing on this issue.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Gardner respectfully requests that this Court grant
rehearing on the issues raised in his Petition for Rehearing and
Supplemental Petition for Rehearing.

Mr. Gardner further requests

that he be permitted oral argument on the issues raised in his
Petition for Rehearing in order to more fully apprise the Court of
the merits of those issues.
Respectfully submitted this

^c-' day of September, 1989
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ADDENDUM A

1

CASE, DOES TOTAL AGGRAVATION OUTWEIGH TOTAL MITIGATION

2

BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT?

3

MIGHT, HERE.

4

EXISTENCE OF AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE BEYOND A

5

REASONABLE DOUBT, JUST PRESENT EVIDENCE IN WHICH YOU MAY

6

FIND AGGRAVATION.

7

THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE MUST OUTWEIGH THE MITIGATING

8

CIRCUMSTANCE, JUST THAT YOU ARE SURE BEYOND A REASONABLE

9

DOUBT THAT IT DOES OUTWEIGH IT.

10

NOW, NOTICE TWO THINGS, IF YOU

THE STATE DOESN'T HAVE TO PROVE THE

ALSO, THERE IS NO SPECIFIC AMOUNT THAT

FOR EXAMPLE, IF YOU COULD QUANTIFY IT -- AND I

11

KNOW YOU CAN'T -- BUT JUST AS AN EXAMPLE, IF YOU FOUND ON

12

THE ONE HAND, SAY, 25 POUNDS OF MITIGATION AND ON THE OTHER

13

HAND 25 POUNDS AND ONE OUNCE OF AGGRAVATION, AND IF YOU

14

WERE SURE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THAT AGGRAVATION

15

WEIGHED 25 POUNDS AND ONE OUNCE AND THE MITIGATION ONLY

16

25 POUNDS, THEN THE AGGRAVATION WOULD OUTWEIGH THE

17

MITIGATION BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

18

FURTHERMORE, THE COURT HAS INSTRUCTED YOU THAT

19

YOU CAN CONSIDER AS AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE

20 |

THE VERY SAME MATTERS WHICH YOU THOUGHT TO BE AGGRAVATING

21 I

IN THE GUILT PHASE.

22
23

NOW, LET ME READ YOU, FROM PAGE k OF THE
INSTRUCTION, SOME AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES UPON WHICH YOU
^•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••^

24
25

ARE INSTRUCTED, ARE AS FOLLOWS:
"ONE, THE DEFENDANT, RONNIE

.:L,'.A«C i S *

1626

LEE GARDNER, KNOWINGLY CREATED
A RISK OF DEATH TO A PERSON
OTHER 'rHAN THE VICTIM, MICHAEL
JOSEPH BURDELL, AND THE
DEFENDANT, RONNIE LEE GARDNER."
NOW, YOU NOTICE THAT THESE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE
• • • • H B I I i ^ l l ^ l i H ^ l ^ B I ^ M I H M H M M i l ^

THE SAME ONES WHICH YOU FOUND BY YOUR SPECIAL VERDICT IN
THE GUILT PHASE.

SO, OBVIOUSLY, THESE WILL BE ONES THAT

YOU HAVE ALREADY FOUND BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, EVEN
THOUGH THAT'S NOT THE STANDARD AND ONES THAT YOU SHOULD
FIND IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, THE SENTENCING PHASE, TO BE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES. YOU HAVE ALREADY FOUND THAT ONE.
YOU HAVE ALREADY FOUND THAT BOB MACRI WAS THE
OTHER PERSON WHOSE LIFE AT THAT PARTICULAR TIME WAS IN
GREAT DANGER.
"NUMBER TWO, THE HOMICIDE
WAS COMMITTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF

EFFECTING THE ESCAPE OF THE
DEFENDANT, RONNIE LEE GARDNER,
FROM LAWFUL CUSTODY."
THE FACT THE HOMICIDE WAS COMMITTED TO
EFFECTUATE THE DEFENDANT'S ESCAPE SHOWS THE HOMICIDE WAS
COMMITTED TO BRING ABOUT ANOTHER VERY SERIOUS CRIME, ESCAPE

P»
FROM THE UTAH STATE PRISON.
"NUMBER THREE, THE DEFENDANT,

RONNIE LEE GARDNER, WAS
^•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••fe
PREVIOUSLY CONVICTED OF A
^••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••ft
FELONY

INVOLVING THE USE OR

THREAT OF VIOLENCE TO A
PERSON,

TO W I T :

ROBBERY."

THE FACT THAT THE HOMICIDE WAS COMMITTED BY A
PERSON WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN TWICE CONVICTED OF CRIMES
«••••••••••
INVOLVING THREAT OR VIOLENCE;, ROBBERIES, GOES A LONG WAY
IN

CASTING LIGHT ON THE CHARACTER OF THE DEFENDANT.
I

THESE

SUBMIT" TO YOU,

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

THAT

PARTICULAR AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU HAVE

ALREADY FOUND ARE OF GREAT WEIGHT.
WELL, WHAT OTHER AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
YOU CONSIDER?

THE KEY,

AGAIN,

IS

LOOK AT THE NATURE OF THE

CRIME AND THE CHARACTER OF THE DEFENDANT.
SOME TO YOU.

CAN

LET ME SUGGEST

WHAT ABOUT THE DEFENDANT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD

THE LEGAL PROCESS?
RESPONSIBILITIES

WHAT ABOUT H I S

FOR H I S

REFUSAL TO ACCEPT

ACTS?

AT THE TIME OF THE H O M I C I D E ,

THE DEFENDANT HAD

BEEN CONVICTED AND SENTENCED TO PRISON FOR SEVERAL FELONIES^
BUT EITHER THE DEFENDANT D I D N ' T

THINK THESE LEGAL JUDGMENTS

AND CONVICTIONS WERE PROPER OR HE D I D N ' T

CARE BECAUSE FOUR

TIMES HE ESCAPED OR TRIED TO ESCAPE FROM THE CONSEQUENCES
OF THOSE J U D I C I A L ACTS.
APRIL

2ND OF 1 9 8 5 ,

AT THE TIME OF THE HOMICIDE ON

THE DEFENDANT HAD ALREADY SHOT AND

